Outline:

Introduction

Get There Itis is one of the most persistent and dangerous psychological traps in general aviation, quietly overriding sound judgment whenever a pilot becomes fixated on completing a flight regardless of changing conditions. Because it stems from ordinary human motivations, the desire to avoid disappointing others, to prove competence, or to see a plan through, it can affect even experienced, well-trained pilots without their awareness.

1. What Is Get There Itis?

Summary

Get There Itis is an informal but well-recognized aviation hazard describing a pilot's fixation on reaching a destination despite mounting risk factors. It leads pilots to make flawed go or no-go decisions and to resist adjusting expectations once a flight is already underway.

Supporting Points

• Get There Itis functions as an aviation-specific decision-making disease that distorts risk perception.

• It most commonly manifests in flawed go or no-go decisions before departure.

• Once airborne, affected pilots often fail to reassess the flight as conditions change.

• The condition can affect pilots of any experience level, not just low-time aviators.

Conclusion

Recognizing Get There Itis as a distinct and nameable hazard gives CFIs a concrete starting point for teaching risk awareness to their students.

2. Why It Happens: External Pressure

Summary

Much of the pressure behind Get There Itis originates outside the cockpit, driven by the practical reasons a pilot chose to fly in the first place. Pilots often feel obligated to deliver results for passengers or for themselves, even when conditions argue otherwise.

Supporting Points

• Pilots frequently use aircraft specifically to shorten travel time or accomplish a defined objective.

• A sense of obligation to "come through" for passengers can override caution.

• The desire to avoid disappointing others adds emotional weight to the decision.

• These pressures build well before the preflight briefing even begins.

Conclusion

Instructors who help students name these external pressures early give them a better chance of recognizing when those pressures are steering a flawed decision.

3. Why It Happens: Internal Pressure

Summary

Beyond external obligations, Get There Itis is reinforced by internal psychological drivers, particularly a pilot's discomfort with feeling inadequate. Completing the flight offers a tangible, visible outcome, while the risks being taken to get there remain abstract and easy to discount.

Supporting Points

• Pilots often resist the idea that their skills or judgment might be insufficient for the conditions.

• A gradual willingness to "push it a little bit" compounds over the course of a flight.

• Completing the flight produces an immediate, tangible sense of success.

• Risk, by contrast, remains an abstract and less tangible concept in the moment.

Conclusion

Teaching students to treat risk as concretely as outcome helps counterbalance this internal bias toward completion.

4. Would It Happen to a Non-Pilot?

Summary

Get There Itis is not unique to aviation; similar decision-making failures appear in boating and competitive sports, though the consequences in those settings are typically less severe. This suggests the root issue may be less about flying specifically and more about a general risk-taking tendency shared by many pilots.

Supporting Points

• The same psychological pattern occurs in boating with comparable decision failures.

• Competitive sports show a similar tendency to push through worsening conditions.

• Consequences in these other activities are generally lower than in aviation.

• Pilots as a group tend to be risk takers at heart, which may predispose them to this pattern.

Conclusion

Understanding that this bias is a broader human tendency, not an aviation-exclusive flaw, helps instructors frame it as a trainable behavior rather than a personal failing.

5. Does It All Come Down to Hazardous Attitudes?

Summary

Get There Itis sometimes overlaps with the five classic hazardous attitudes, but the connection is not absolute. The more consistent thread across cases is what is actually driving the flight, specifically, the pilot's fixation on results.

Supporting Points

• Hazardous attitudes such as invulnerability or macho can contribute, but only sometimes.

• The deciding factor is more often what outcome the pilot is chasing than any single attitude.

• A results-driven mindset can override training even in pilots without an obvious hazardous attitude.

• This distinction matters for how instructors diagnose and address the behavior in students.

Conclusion

CFIs should teach the hazardous attitudes framework alongside a broader look at what outcome is motivating a given flight.

6. What Is the Biggest Driver of the Go/No-Go Decision?

Summary

The single biggest driver behind a flawed go or no-go decision is the perceived significance of completing the flight successfully. When ego, past failed missions, or feelings of inadequacy are attached to the outcome, the decision stops being centered on safety.

Supporting Points

• The significance a pilot attaches to a completed flight can outweigh objective risk factors.

• Decisions are not always centered on what is actually the safest course of action.

• Ego plays a measurable role in pushing pilots toward completion.

• Memories of previously failed or scrubbed missions can add extra pressure to succeed this time.

Conclusion

Helping students separate their sense of self-worth from the outcome of any single flight is a core defense against this driver.

7. Why Doesn't This Happen at Airlines?

Summary

Airline operations are structured to prevent Get There Itis through layered training and shared accountability. Dispatchers, ground captains, and full crew involvement create multiple independent touchpoints on every flight decision.

Supporting Points

• Structured, recurring training reduces the influence of individual emotional bias.

• Dispatch and ground captains provide an outside check on every flight decision.

• Crew decision-making distributes authority so no single person bears the full pressure.

• Multiple touchpoints throughout the process catch risk factors a single pilot might miss.

Conclusion

General aviation pilots can borrow this same structural principle even without an airline's resources.

8. Building Your Own Dispatch Network

Summary

General aviation pilots can replicate the airline dispatch model on a small scale by recruiting a trusted CFI or pilot friend to act as an outside check on flight decisions. The key is agreeing in advance to honor that outside input.

Supporting Points

• A CFI or pilot friend can serve informally as a personal dispatcher.

• Building a small, trusted network of potential dispatchers strengthens this system over time.

• The pilot must commit in advance to adhering to the group's decision.

• This structure introduces the same outside accountability airlines rely on.

Conclusion

Instructors can encourage students to establish this kind of personal dispatch network long before it is ever needed.

9. Practical Prevention Strategies

Summary

Beyond building an outside accountability network, pilots can reduce Get There Itis risk through deliberate advance planning. Removing rigid commitments and preparing alternatives ahead of time takes much of the pressure off the day of the flight.

Supporting Points

• Avoid scheduling flights around commitments that carry serious consequences if missed.

• Avoid making flights where a delay or cancellation would create real hardship.

• Book alternative travel arrangements well in advance of the flight.

• Brief passengers ahead of time so they understand alternatives may be needed.

Conclusion

Advance planning removes much of the emotional weight that fuels Get There Itis before a pilot ever reaches the airport.

10. Resources and Continued Learning

Summary

Several established aviation safety organizations offer additional material on this topic, including case study video content from the AOPA Air Safety Institute. Instructors are also encouraged to stay connected through professional organizations that reinforce safe decision-making culture.

Supporting Points

• The AOPA Air Safety Institute's Get Home Itis accident case study video examines a real-world fair weather flyer scenario.

• The Society of Aviation and Flight Educators offers ongoing instructor development resources.

• The National Association of Flight Instructors provides additional professional support and community.

• The CFI Study Group on Facebook offers a peer forum for discussing scenarios like this one.

Conclusion

Staying engaged with these resources helps CFIs keep this topic current in their own teaching and in their students' training.